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BOOK REVIEW
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860.
By MORTON J. HoRwrrz. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977. Pp. xvii, 356. Price $16.50.
Morris S. Arnold t
Professor Horwitz's title is descriptive: his book traces and
interprets the changes in American law, roughly between 1780 and
1860, that occurred in response to the emerging developmental and
entrepreneurial ethic of the nineteenth century. Other legal
historians before him have seen the nineteenth century as a "Golden
Age," 1 or have spoken of the "release of energy" 2 that occurred dur-
ing the era; but until now, no one has described in anything like the
detail present here the transformations in private-law doctrines that
characterized the times. More important than this detailed descrip-
tion, however, is the framework provided in Horwitz's sustained
analysis of the causes and effects of those changes. No single book
can hope to be entirely successful at surveying in an interpretive
way the whole of American law during so long and important a
time span, part of which is not illuminated by sufficient source
material to make conclusions very easy or entirely trustworthy. But
in many important aspects, the book is convincing, and gives
American legal historians what they have not had before-a
systemic way into their subject, an example to imitate. It is
among the most interesting and intriguing books on American legal
history ever produced. But a model to aspire to is often also a
target to shoot at, and much future energy will likely be expended
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968,
University of Arkansas; LL.M. 1969, S.J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School.
I had the advantage of using Professor Horwitz's excellent teaching materials in
my American Legal History class in the Spring of 1977 at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School. The students in that class contributed very substantially to
my understanding of nineteenth-century legal history, and, without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, Mr. Curtis E. A. Karnow and Ms. Virginia Kerr were
especially helpful in that they asked questions to which I did not always have very
good answers to hand. My students were truly my teachers.
I Haar, Preface to Tm CoLDF.N AcE OF AMEBCAN LAw at v (C. Haar, ed.
1965).
2 NV. HuusT, LAw T=mrns CoN'mrnoNs oF FRaaom 3-32 (1956).
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trying to catch Horwitz out. This Review will, among other things,
attempt in a small way to demonstrate how this might be done with
respect to a few particular points and to some general themes of
the work.
I.
Horwitz begins by demonstrating that early nineteenth-century
judges, unlike their eighteenth-century counterparts, self-con-
sciously took it upon themselves to mold the law in order to pro-
mote policies that they believed the public welfare required. This
creative, activist model of judicial behavior, a manifestation of the
belief that the common law ought to be responsive to changing
social forces, has a curiously twentieth-century aura, but was the
invention, roughly speaking, of the first quarter of the nineteenth
century. By contrast, eighteenth-century judges had viewed the
common law as basically fixed and changeless, the product of reason
and custom. This earlier natural law theory of adjudication gave
way to the innovative one, Horwitz believes, as a result of a change
in the general conception of law brought about partly by the
revolution and its concomitant political theories.3 Briefly put, his
theory is that the notion of popular sovereignty gave rise to the
belief that all law (even common law) was the creature of wil
and not simply the product of reason; law was to be manipulated to
serve the sovereign's sense of necessity. So law began to be viewed
in "instrumental" terms, as something to be used to accomplish a
policy instead of simply discovered to settle a dispute in accordance
with a preexisting justice. And, the book's argument runs, an
eighteenth-century doctrine of strict adherence to precedent was
replaced by the fast and loose judicial style of the nineteenth.4
Now Horwitz is quite clearly correct, as he admirably demon-
strates, that America's view of adjudication did change, roughly,
from one of discovery to one of policy vindication. But it is not
easy to see how the notion of sovereignty got translated into judicial
activism. One would rather expect that the view of law as will
would result in judicial timidity, as it eventually did in England;
however, it is right that in England parliamentary, not popular,
sovereignty was the nineteenth-century constitutional rule. Horwitz
says that post-revolutionary thought sought to explain the in-
novative power of judges by describing them as "trustees" or
3 This is the theme of the book's first chapter. M. HoRwn-z, THE TtNs-
FoBmAToN oF A4M C L.w 1780-1860 at 1-30 (1977).
4 Id. 26.
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"agents" of the sovereign; but no examples are given, and this is
surely a rather peculiar way to describe what judges do. But per-
haps it is simply my own after-mindedness (or, worse, political in-
clination) that sees popular sovereignty and judicial creativity as
inevitably inimical.
The question of the changing role of precedent is even more
troubling. The notion that law is discoverable by observation and
deduction, the natural law theory of adjudication, tends rather away
from the rigid stare decisis principle ascribed by Horwitz to
eighteenth-century courts 5 than toward it. The previous "dis-
covery" may well have been erroneous, and a judge's (or jury's) job
is to do justice according to right and not according to precedent.
Reason should govern, not example. Moreover, even if by some
peculiar twist of logic colonial judges did feel the need to conform
to previous case law, it is not easy to know where they might turn.
There were no American reports at all, and English reports, with a
few distinguished exceptions, were intermittent and frequently un-
trustworthy. Indeed, it is not easy to locate the idea of stare
decisis in English jurisprudence before the nineteenth century.6
II.
For whatever reasons, however, and whether as a result of or
despite post-revolutionary notions regarding the nature and source
of law, nineteenth-century judges did set out to transform the
common law in many of its most important aspects. Not every anti-
developmental rule fell, of course, for as Horwitz says the judges
sometimes "regarded the weight of the received legal tradition as
just too overwhelming to allow for innovation." 7 But the law of
property was certainly harnessed to the task of economic develop-
ment: the "natural flow" rule of riparian rights was relaxed to
5Id. 8.
6J. DAwsoN, TrS Acrs OF =t LAW 83-90 (1968). This is a very
complicated matter and deserves serious investigation, but a brief outline of the
difficulty as I see it can be given here. As Horwitz shows, very little control over
the jury was exerted by eighteenth-century judges. Now jury control devices are
necessary for generating legal opinions by judges whether written or not; and
opinions are necessary for a system of stare decisis in the usual sense. Of course
a system of precedent could be based on custom. But if jury control techniques
were rare before the revolution, juries, not judges, would be responsible for keeping
the custom pure. A proper analysis of this difficulty will require separate treatment
of procedural and substantive law, and, within the substantive division, distinct
consideration of criminal and civil law. Moreover, separate consideration of the law
of real property would seem to be necessary because special verdicts were common
in that area of the law and uncommon elsewhere.
7 M. Honwrrz, supra note 3, at 83.
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allow for competitive use of water; the doctrine of prescription was
partially overthrown to allow land development that produced ex-
ternalities; the law of waste was relaxed to allow life tenants and
other temporary'occupants of land to alter their estates to make
them more productive; and, perhaps most important, the law of
nuisance was allowed more and more to drift away from its organiz-
ing maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas toward a new bal-
ancing test that measured the relative utility of competing land
uses.8 Horwitz marshals impressive evidence to document these
changes and he is in this respect very convincing. Furthermore, he
correctly points out that in these and other ways certain injuries
became noncompensable; and so it often fell out that those "land-
owners whose property values were impaired without compensation
in effect were compelled to underwrite a portion of economic de-
velopment." 9 More and more, courts resorted to the idea of
damnum absque injuria to deny a plaintiff's claim. -By accom-
plishing subsidization through the legal system rather than through
taxation, Horwitz maintains, the ultimate political choices were
hidden from view and insulated from debate.'0 The developmental
urge had captured the courts, and it was by this allegedly apolitical
agency of government that the subsidy was levied.
All this, as I say, is convincingly argued. There may have been
some rather extensive redistribution going on, and if so, the develop-
mentally minded were, partly at least, the benefited parties. Not all
developers would win, for some would be inefficient even with a
subsidy; but still, in general, developers as a class, or, as Horwitz
has it, the "dynamic and growing forces in American society," 11
the "active and powerful elements" 12 would have been the chief
beneficiaries of the transformation. Yet the losers are more difficult
to identify. Horwitz calls them "the weak and relatively power-
less" 13 and "the weakest and least active elements in the popula-
tion." 14 There is a tautological sense in which a person who is
victimized this way is necessarily "weak" and "powerless": if he were
otherwise he would have acted to prevent it. But there is another
tautological sense in which victims are neither weak nor powerless:
s Id. 32-34; see id. 56-58, 74-78.
9Id. 70.
10 Id. 101.
1 Id. 99.
12 Id. 108.
13 Id. 99.
14 Id. 101.
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in order to be victimized, one needs to be propertied. A substantial
landowner who finds himself powerless to enjoin an injurious
activity because of a transformation in nuisance doctrine may be
very considerably damaged, but it seems somewhat curious to de-
scribe him, before the fact, as "weak" or "powerless." Indeed, the
"weakest" and most "powerless" of the society are the dispossessed;
and they, by definition, having nothing, have nothing to lose. Still,
it is true that the non-propertied classes might have lost something
during this transforming period, for, as Horwitz shows, the general
compensation principle of the eighteenth century gave way to a
predominantly negligence-oriented tort law in the nineteenth. 15 To
the extent that the right to be free from even non-negligently caused
injury is a property right, everyone, even the dispossessed, may have
lost something to the active elements of American society. Whether
liability rules might be property became much debated, of course,
during the heyday of substantive due process.
Still there is a larger point to be made here, and that is that
while the proproductive law of the nineteenth century may have
robbed some of their property in the more usual sense, and everyone
of their common-law liability rules, economic development may
have so benefited society in general that the result to even the un-
propertied was a net increase in utilitarian terms. We are not deal-
ing here with a zero-sum game, and the subsidy may possibly have
amounted merely to compensation to the entrepreneurial class for
benefits conferred and otherwise uncollectable. In other words, the
transformation in liability rules can be seen as a kind of hidden,
general unjust enrichment remedy, and the resulting social structure,
even with the "subsidy," may have been very nearly pareto superior.
It was almost certainly Kaldor-Hicks efficient. The conclusion that
nineteenth-century legal changes actively promoted a "legal redis-
tribution of wealth" 16 is probably correct to some degree; but it is a
real question whether the redistribution was large and who the
losers were. Take the concrete case of an ordinary nonpropertied
working person, say, a railroad employee. He may be benefited by
lower costs of goods because of lower transportation costs. More-
over, the loss to him represented by a changed liability rule may
have been more particularly compensated for by higher wages than
would otherwise be forthcoming.
I am not suggesting that Horwitz's thesis is necessarily errone-
ous, only that this proposed analysis is at least a not altogether im-
15 Id. 85-99.
26 Id. 254.
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plausible alternative. Economics is, after all, an empirical science,
and research by economic historians with respect to what does
happen (and what did happen) would greatly enhance our chances
of correctly interpreting the causes and effects of nineteenth-century
legal development.
III.
One of the most striking theses of the book is that eighteenth
and nineteenth-century contract law were fundamentally different,
the one being based on flexible regulatory notions of substantive
justice and just price, the other on hard-line and literal enforcement
of bargains precisely as made.17 Horwitz argues, for instance, that
in the eighteenth century there was at law and equity a substantive
theory of consideration, that is, that adequacy would be examined
into, and necessary adjustments made by juries, if the agreed price
seemed in some manner unfair.' 8 That this was the rule in equity
has been for some time recognized; but the existence of an identical
rule at law, for which Horwitz produces much evidence, is very
surprising indeed. But Horwitz's theory is not free from difficulty.
In the first place, his general description of the "substantive
justice" characteristic of eighteenth-century American contract law
as a survival of "the medieval tradition" 19 seems off the mark. It is
true that it is always hazardous to speak of medieval substantive
rules since jurors were conceded so much control over results and
hardly ever explained themselves. Still, there is good evidence that
a basic tenet of medieval law was that promises, once made, ought
to be kept.20 The writ of covenant contemplated specific perform-
ance-no apparent room here even for Holmes' supposed "right" to
break a contract and pay damages.2 1 Moreover, there is no evidence
in medieval law for the existence of a doctrine of consideration at
all; and, for all we know, even gift promises were specifically en-
forceable. It is not until the sixteenth century that the doctrine of
consideration becomes anything like a general feature of the law of
contracts. Secondly, the widespread use of the penal bond in the
middle ages to secure the performance of promises makes it even
clearer that the chief object of medieval contract law was perform-
ance. Even a bond defeasible upon performing an impossible act
17See generally, id. 160-210.
18 Id. 164-73.
19 Id. 160.
20 See generally Arnold, Fourteenth-Century Promises, 35 C.,N. LJ. 321
(1975).
210. W. HoLvrs, Jn., THE CoMMoN LAw 235-36 (Belknap Press ed. 1963).
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was regarded as good. Obviously, then, the "unfairness" of the ob-
ligation to pay could be no defense. Indeed, the whole point of the
bond was to make nonperformance so costly as not to be lightly
contemplated. Still, developments in the seventeenth century do
point to a softening of the rigor of common-law contract principles:
penalties and forfeitures of all types came to be avoidable in equity.22
Such rearrangements may have made popular a general interven-
tionist ethic, or may indeed simply be specific adoptions of an al-
ready paternalistic community attitude. A similar community feel-
ing might have come to be vindicated by eighteenth-century
American jurors.
A more telling difficulty with the Horwitz theory, however,
surfaces in his treatment of implied warranties of quality in the sale
of chattels.23 He shows that there was much reliance in the
eighteenth century on the maxim that "a sound price warrants a
sound commodity"; and from this, and other evidence, he concludes
that there was a warranty implied by law in the sale of goods. But
the cited cases do not always bear out the conclusion. The buyer's
common-law action for defective goods alleged both fraud (knowl-
edge of the defect, scienter) and an express warranty. In Wadill v.
Chamberayne. 4 a 1735 case, there was no express warranty alleged,
only fraud, so the writ was not in common form; but the court held
the action good. However, this is evidence only that an express
warranty was unnecessary if fraud could be proven; it says nothing
about implied warranties. Indeed, if there was a doctrine of implied
warranty, it would seem that the plaintiff would have pursued that
theory instead, since scienter is so difficult to prove. Moreover, two
other eighteenth century cases relied on by Horwitz, Baker v.
Frobisher2 and Toris v. Long,26 seem to proceed on the premise
that there is an implied warranty only against latent defects; ap-
parently if the defect were patent, at least if it were actually dis-
covered by the buyer, the contract would be enforced as made. Of
course, if this is the extent of the implied warranty, then the alleged
principle of equality of exchange, the substantive theory of con-
sideration, is impossible to maintain. It is, however, just possible
22 See Yale, Introduction to 2 Loand NoTr=Gmm's Cmu&cy CASES 8-15
(D. Yale ed. 1961).
23 M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 167, 180.
242 Va. Colonial Decisions B45 (Gen. Ct. 1735) (cited M. Houwrrz, supra
note 3, at 167 n.40).
25 Quincy 4 (Super. Ct. of Judic. Mass. Bay 1762) (cited M. Honwrrz, supra
note 3 at 167 n.40).
26 1 N.C. Tayl. 17 (Super. Ct. 1799) (cited M. Horwrrz, supra note 3 at 167
n.40).
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that the principle existed but could be vindicated only in a suit by
the seller for the purchase price; and that when the buyer sued on
an executed contract adequacy would not be inquired into. The
distinction seems somewhat gratuitous, but some chancery courts
have been known to adopt it.
A final obstacle to the Horwitz thesis is Professor Nelson's con-
clusion that, although eighteenth-century law did not actively en-
courage assumptions of promissory liability, a buyer, if he made a
specific promise, "became liable in special assumpsit to the extent
of the promise." 27 At least if the promise were in writing, Nelson
concludes, a buyer was "barred from claiming in defense 'that the
consideration which he rec'd . . . was not of half the value' of his
promise or otherwise represented only a partial consideration." 28
Horwitz maintains that the law treated notes "as an exception to the
general rule governing contracts." 20 But if so, it would be interest-
ing to know how frequently notes were employed; for if they were
common the "general rule" may have been very generally avoided.
IV.
So complicated a work as this deserves more space than can
conscionably be given over to a book review. An excellent chapter 80
on the relationships between the bar and commercial interests, for
instance, has not been touched on; nor has a similarly intriguing
chapter 31 on the rise of legal formalism. The contents of both of
these, however, can be briefly stated: they deal with the institutions
and judicial techniques by which commercial needs came to work
their will on the common law. Horwitz demonstrates again and
again that this happened. But in a sense it would be surprising if
it had not, so committed was the age, or at least its most powerful
people, to the ideal of commercial development. Moreover, not
every episode is as convincingly related as others. For instance, the
rule of negotiability, certainly a pro-commercial doctrine, was re-
sisted sedulously in many of the state courts; and so, Horwitz main-
tains, Joseph Story in Swift v. Tyson 3 2 created a national and, more
important, a pro-commercial rule of negotiability in. the federal
27 W. NELSON, AEmICANiZmTON oF THE CommoN L~w 60 (1975).
28 Id.
29 M. HoRwU-z, supra note 3, at 166 n.33.
30 Id. 140-159.
31 Id. 253-266.
3241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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courts.33 But it is a question, if commercial convenience was such a
favorite object of nineteenth-century judges, why in this instance
most, or many, seemed so backward. Furthermore, the federal rule
would be available only to those whose cases possessed the require-
ments for invoking that jurisdiction. Of course, it is possible that
many suits on written instruments might easily meet these requi-
sites: if the paper had been extensively circulated, perhaps a large
number of remote endorsers would have been potential defendants,
and that might have made a diversity case easy to make out.
There is one further point. It may be that Horwitz has been
too quick to see distributional effects in nineteenth-century legal
changes. Take, for instance, the assertion that the change to the
rule of caveat emptor, if it occurred, had distributional consequences
to the detriment of buyers.34 It may simply be instead that the
price of goods declined to compensate for the lack of a warranty, so
that what a buyer lost was regained in the purchase price. It is true
that if buyers in general did not know of the rule, the market would
probably not so operate; but many must surely have known, and
this would have produced a corresponding reduction in price. Un-
equal knowledge of the existence of defects might at first seem to
result in enrichment of the seller, but, technically, the law was that
the seller had a duty to disclose such defects if he knew of them. It
is true that scienter is notoriously difficult to prove, but nevertheless
the scienter action does survive a caveat emptor regime. Similar
criticism can be made of distributions allegedly occurring as a result
of allowing persons to "contract out" of a legal liability.35 If the
risk of loss is shifted by contract, say, to a shipping customer of a
railroad, it is difficult to know that this will not be reflected in lower
shipping costs in the amount, as it were, of an insurance premium
sufficient to cover the risk. Of course, it must have often happened
that transportation companies would be in a monopoly position;
but even so they may well have been unable to impose an ex-
culpatory clause without giving up something in return.3 6 What-
ever may be the reality, the book has the virtue of being mainly
nondidactic and laudably free of Marxian moralizing, although we
33 M. Honwrrz, supra note 3, at 245-252.
34 Id. 61.
35 See id. 203-10. Moreover, "contracting out" may well have been a feature
of the law of torts since the middle ages. Perhaps however, I have misunderstood
Horwitz when I charge him with claiming a redistributional consequence in "con-
tracting out" situations.
86 See Schwartz, Nonsubstantive Aspects of Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv.
- (1977).
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do hear (once each) of oppression, 2 class bias,38 and class legisla-
tion. 9 The "oppression" referred to has to do with the rise of the
subjective theory of value and the subsequent refusal of courts to
inquire into adequacy of consideration. This could be endlessly
commented on, but perhaps it is enough for present purposes to
note that many people feel oppressed when promises, freely made,
are broken. The "class bias" is discovered in the rule that labor
contracts were "entire," that is, that no quantum meruit recovery
could be had on a partially completed contract of service, while, on
the other hand, building contractors who failed to complete their
work were normally allowed a recovery "off the contract." Horwitz
may well be correct on this one, although it would be interesting to
know what the result would have been in the builder's case if a
defendant should claim a willful and deliberate breach.
But enough cavilling. This book deserves to be read by any-
one interested in the history of eighteenth and nineteenth-century
America, as it for the most part succeeds in its aim "to make the
history of technical and obscure areas of American law accessible to
professional historians and to other nonlegally trained scholars." 40
There is much that is disputable; but that makes it all the more
worthy of attention.
37 Id. 184.
38 Id. 188.
39 Id. 192.
40 Id. 2d.
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